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Graham FarrellAbstract
Many studies have sought to explain the major crime declines experienced in most advanced countries. Key
hypotheses relate to: lead poisoning; abortion legalization; drug markets; demographics; policing numbers and
strategies; imprisonment; strong economies; the death penalty; gun control; gun concealment; immigration;
consumer confidence; the civilizing process, and; improved security. This paper outlines five tests that a hypothesis
should pass to be considered further. It finds that fourteen of the fifteen hypotheses fail two or more tests. The
security hypothesis appears to pass the tests, and thereby pave the way for further research.
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Most advanced countries have experienced a major de-
cline in street crime during the last two decades, but
with some variation in the extent, timing, and crimes in-
volved. This ‘crime drop’ was heralded in the United
States where total violent crime fell over seventy percent
between 1993 and 2011 (Truman and Planty 2012).
Some property crimes in the US, particularly burglary
and theft, have been falling since the early 1970s
according to the National Crime Victimization Survey.
Also in the mid-1990s, the UK began to experience
dramatic declines across a wide range of property, per-
sonal and violent crimes, many falling by half or more
(Office of National Statistics 2013). The sharp drops in
Canada’s homicide and other crime has generally been
remarkably similar to that in the US (Ouimet 2002a),
while New Zealand experienced rather similar declines
in property crime (burglary, motor vehicle theft, and
other theft) but not all personal crimes (Mayhew 2012).
In this context, the crime drop in Australia seems de-
layed, beginning around 2001 where after motor ve-
hicle theft led steep falls in burglary, theft and robbery
but not some personal crimes (Mayhew 2012). There is
considerable evidence, from the International Crime
Victims Survey in particular, that most European
countries have experienced significant crime drops
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in any medium, provided the original work is ptempered by some analysis of the variation (Aebi and
Lande 2012), and the suggestion that Switzerland has
not (Killias and Lanfranconi 2012). While recognising
variation between and within countries, Tseloni et al.
(2010) suggest the crime drop is more widespread than
advanced countries and could perhaps be labeled as
global. Knepper (2012) reviews the evidence from both
sides and concludes there is a significant and wide-
spread international crime drop with some variation in
its nature.
There have been various efforts to try to explain the
crime drop over the last two decades. Fifteen key hy-
potheses from the academic literature are summarized
in Table 1. This includes twelve identified in the reviews
of Levitt (2004) and Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008),
and readers are referred to those studies for add-
itional details. Three hypotheses are included that
have gained ground since those reviews, and they
are referenced further herein. Since crime drop re-
search has expanded in recent years, it is possible
that this is not an exhaustive list of hypotheses.
However, it should be possible to apply the present
study’s approach to other hypotheses.
This study sets out five tests that, it is proposed, a
crime drop hypothesis must pass to be considered
worthy of further scrutiny. The tests are proposed as ne-
cessary but not sufficient criteria to identify a viable the-
ory of the crime drop.n Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
Table 1 Fifteen hypotheses
Name Mechanism
Strong economy Wealthy offenders commit less crime
Concealed weapons laws More defensive guns, less crime
Capital punishment More death penalty deterred crime
Gun control laws Less guns, less crime
Rising prison population Incapacitation and deterrence
reduce crime
Policing strategies Policing focused on crime problems
(Compstat, POP)
More police More police detected and
deterred crime
Legalization of abortion More abortion since 1973,
less offenders by 1990s
Immigration Immigrants commit less crime,
so crime fell as immigration rose
Consumer confidence Wealthy buy less from stolen
goods markets
Waning crack market 2nd generation youth deterred
by violence and prison for elders
Childhood lead Lead poisoning of children
made them adolescent criminals
Changing demographics Aging population means relatively
less young offenders
Civilizing process Social institutions more legitimate
(1960s-80s = age of protest)
Improved security Improved security, reduced crime
opportunities
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The five tests
The proposed tests are:
1. The preliminary evidence test
Are there reasonable empirical grounds to consider
the hypothesis, even if it is disputed?
2. The cross-national test
Can the hypothesis be applied to different countries
(e.g. to Canada for hypotheses developed for the
US)?
3. The prior crime increase test
Is the hypothesis compatible, or at least not in
contradiction, with the fact that crime was
previously generally increasing for several decades?
4. The phone theft and e-crimes test
Is the hypothesis compatible, or at least not in
contradiction, with the fact that some crimes such
as phone theft and e-crimes were increasing while
many crime types were decreasing?
5. The varying trajectories test
Is the hypothesis compatible, or at least not in
contradiction, with variation in the timing and
trajectory of crime falls both between countries and
between crime types?Each test is described in more detail below as it is ap-
plied to the hypotheses shown in Table 1.
Results and discussion
The preliminary evidence test
To pass this test, a hypothesis should not have been com-
prehensively falsified. The decision-making for this test
uses the reviews by Levitt (2004) and Blumstein and
Rosenfeld (2008) which are taken to be state-of-the-art
works by leading scholars. For present purposes then, the
hypotheses taken to have been falsified are increased cap-
ital punishment, newly implemented gun control laws, or
laws allowing concealed weapons, and the strong economy,
which were dismissed on the balance of evidence presented
by Levitt (2004) as well as explicitly (or implicitly by exclu-
sion) in the review of Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008).
Where either review determined that a hypothesis holds
some empirical validity, then it passes the first test.
The civilizing process hypothesis is given a bye for this
test as it is potentially credible despite the lack of
evidence-based research. This is not without reservation,
since as one of its proponents notes, it has problems
“not the least of which is whether such a theoretical
perspective could be moved beyond the level of
speculation and be subjected to more rigorous
empirical tests.” (Eisner 2008; 312)
All additional hypotheses are taken to pass the test for
present purposes even though some are disputed and
others claim only a minor role including demographics
(generally found to account for around 10 to 15 percent
– see Fox 2000) and immigration (Stowell et al. 2009
claim it accounts for 6 percent of the crime drop).
Blumstein and Rosenfeld are critical of the notion that
changing demographics induced the crime drop, observ-
ing that in the US,
“during the sharp crime drop of the 1990s, age
composition changes were trending in the wrong
direction: the number of 18-year-olds in the U.S.
population was increasing while crime rates were
declining for other reasons.”
(Blumstein and Rosenfeld 2008; 20).
Nevertheless, for present purposes both demographics
and immigration are taken to retain some support and
pass the test. Likewise, while Levitt (2004), Blumstein
and Rosenfeld (2008) and others have largely discarded
the notion that changed policing strategies induced the
crime drop, it is held to pass the present test because it
continues to garner some support, particularly that of
Zimring (2012) though that study does not seem to
identify a clear mechanism by which policing caused
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used here for this test, with the components summarized
in Table 2, and it serves primarily to separate the wheat
from the chaff.
The cross-national test
Franklin Zimring’s conversion to cross-national com-
parative research is worthy of recall:
“Closer inspection showed that the timing of the
Canadian decline (1991–2000) fit perfectly with the
timing of the declining in the United States (Zimring,
2006:Chapter 5). The extraordinary similarity of these
trends in breadth, magnitude, and timing suggested
that whatever was driving the decline in the United
States was also operating in Canada. … But … Canada
in the 1990s didn’t increase its imprisonment, didn’t
hire more police per 100,000 population, and didn’t
have anything close to the economic boom we
enjoyed south of the border.” (Zimring 2006; 619)
Marc Ouimet had made similar observations (Ouimet
2002), while van Dijk et al. (2008) and Rosenfeld and
Messner (2009) note many European countries with far less
imprisonment than, but similar crime drops to, the US.
Hence others have already noted that some hypotheses
fail what is here termed the cross-national test. It is a
credit to the pioneering nature of US crime drop re-
search and the dearth of studies elsewhere, that most
such hypotheses are US-focused. In addition to those
noted by Zimring it includes gun control laws, concealed
weapons laws, the death penalty, more police officers,Table 2 Preliminary evidence test
Hypotheses Levitt 2004
review
Blumstein & Rosenfeld
2008 review
This
study
Strong economy x x x
Concealed weapons laws x x x
Capital punishment x x x
Gun control laws x x x
Rising prison population ✔ ✔ ✔
Policing strategies x x ✔
More police ✔ x ✔
Legalization of abortion ✔ x ✔
Immigration – – ✔
Consumer confidence – ✔ ✔
Waning crack market ✔ ✔ ✔
Childhood lead – x ✔
Changing demographics x x ✔
Civilizing process – – ✔
Improved security – – ✔
Legend: ✔ = Pass. x = Fail. ‘–’ = not applicable.better policing strategies, the abortion hypothesis (see
also Kahane et al. 2008 for a UK study finding no effect),
and the waning crack market. The last three of these hy-
potheses had passed the first test, but since other coun-
tries did not have the same increase in police officers,
the same change in abortion law, or similarly extensive
crack markets, as the United States, they do not pass the
second.
In relation to the immigration hypothesis, for present
purposes it is assumed that other countries had similar
patterns of immigration to the US. While this may prove
an incorrect assumption it is conservative insofar as it
allows the immigration hypothesis to pass the second
test. Likewise, it is simplest for present purposes to as-
sume other countries had similarly increasing consumer
confidence (Rosenfeld 2009), due to the absence of con-
trary evidence for the present study. An aging popula-
tion seems common across industrialised nations and so
demographics is assumed to pass this test for present
purposes. Pinker (2011) exposition of the civilizing
process hypothesis is arguably applicable to most ad-
vanced countries, and taken to be so for present
purposes.
The two hypotheses that pass this test more compel-
lingly are the childhood lead hypothesis (for which
Nevin (2007) presents cross-national data for several
countries; see also Reyes 2012) and the security hypoth-
esis relating to car theft that has been empirically tested
in Australia, England and Wales, the Netherlands, and
the United States (Farrell et al. 2011a, 2011b; Fujita and
Maxfield 2012; van Ours and Vollaard 2013).
The prior crime increase test
Before the current spate of crime declines, it is fair to
say that crime had increased rapidly over three decades
or so in most advanced countries. A crime drop hypoth-
esis need not necessarily explain why that is however, as
it could be due to distinct factors, but it should not
contradict the fact.
Although some of them already failed the preliminary
evidence test, a key reason that gun control laws, the
death penalty, concealed weapons laws, increased police
numbers, and changed police strategies, were initially
proposed is that they appeared to trigger change at
about the right time (even those where the timing was
subsequently found to be otherwise). The abortion hy-
pothesis can also be assumed to pass this test as the tim-
ing of its effect is anticipated to coincide with the crime
drop in the United States. Crack markets were also held
to decline coincident with the fall in US crime. The civil-
izing process can be taken to pass this test because some
explanation for prior crime increases is offered as due to
the decline in the legitimacy of social institutions in the
countercultures of the ‘swinging sixties’. Tests of the
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ter vehicle security coincides with major declines in ve-
hicle crime, and so it is taken to pass this test.
This leaves five hypotheses that are taken to fail this
test. The US economy and consumer confidence were
strong prior to the 1990s, the prison population rose
earlier, immigration was increasing prior to 1990, and
demographic change has been more gradual. Levitt
(2004) empirically examines whether his conclusions
could apply to the period before the crime drop, finding
that
“Between 1973 and 1991, the incarceration rate more
than tripled, rising from 96 to 313 inmates per 100,000
residents. By my estimates, that should have reduced
violent crime and homicide by over 30 percent and
property crime by more than 20 percent. Note that this
predicted impact of incarceration is much larger than
for the latter period.” (Levitt 2004; 184).
Levitt also finds that previous increases in police num-
bers should have reduced crime, as should the 1973
abortion legalization to some extent, with the crack mar-
ket seemingly accounting for 16 percent of increased
homicide and 8 percent of increased violence from 1973
to 1991. After some attempt to reconcile these findings
it is argued that
“Thus, in contrast to the 1990s, the actual crime
experience in the 1973–1991 period is not well
explained by the set of factors analyzed in this paper…
The real puzzle in my opinion, therefore, is not why
crime fell in the 1990s, but why it did not start falling
sooner.” (Levitt 2004; 186)
However this is not the real puzzle, because it can
never be that crime fell sooner. For the present author it
highlights the fact that much of the analysis does not
pass what is here termed the prior crime increase test.
This third test identifies an issue relating to the child-
hood lead hypothesis, which is that it is really a hypoth-
esis for why pre-1990s crime increased. Increased lead
poisoning caused the crime increase of the 1960s to
1990s. Following that, the removal of lead from gasoline
and other sources is proposed to have induced a fall in
crime, presumably to pre-lead levels. In essence, it ar-
gues, lead poisoning generated more motivated of-
fenders. So, while this is not a criticism, it suggests it is
a theory of crime, and only by its absence does lead poi-
soning provide a theory of the crime drop. It seems to
be unique in that respect in seemingly claiming to ex-
plain all major trends and variation in crime over the
last half century or so. This may be a line of enquiry that
opens the lead hypothesis up to further investigation. Italso implies that routine activity theory is not the com-
pelling explanation for the pre-1990s crime increases
that Cohen and Felson (1979) and others have so con-
vincingly argued.
The phone theft and E-crimes test
Some crime types increased during the crime drop. Most
notable is the large increases in internet-related crime.
This likely occurred too late to have induced the crime
drop as a switch from street crime, and also involves dif-
ferent resources, skills and rewards. Phone theft, in con-
trast, is a street crime which increased when others were
decreasing (Mayhew and Harrington 2001), and at the
time of writing in 2013 is experiencing a resurgence due
to expensive smart phones. More generally, theft of valu-
able electronic goods such as laptops and GPS-Satnavs
have increased. Any explanation of the decline in other
crime types must not contradict these facts.
Most hypotheses fail this test because they suggest that
all types of crime should have decreased. This is because
their focus is the number or the motivation of offenders.
The demographic hypothesis suggests the relative num-
ber of offenders decreased, which suggests commensur-
ate declines in rates of all crime types should occur.
Others with this trait are the childhood lead hypothesis,
the abortion hypothesis, the immigration hypothesis
(perhaps to a lesser extent depending on the identified
mechanism of change), and the waning crack epidemic if
it is held to reduce the number of motivated offenders.
In fact, all of the hypotheses except one appear incom-
patible with increases in some types of crime. The ex-
ception is the security hypothesis which is flexible in
allowing opportunity for some crimes to increase at the
same time as that for others was decreasing.
The varying trajectories test
This test sounds similar to but differs significantly from
the cross-national test. Whereas the cross-national test
emphasised similarity between countries in the existence
of a crime drop, this test reflects the sometimes consid-
erable differences both between countries and between
crime types within countries. Such differences can be in
the timing (when does decline occur?) or trajectory (how
fast is the decline?) for different crime types. Any theor-
etical explanation must be sufficiently flexible to account
for the variation.
Some examples will clarify the justification for this
test. The United States experienced major reductions in
violence in the early 1990s but property crime (burglary
and theft), according to the NCVS, had been declining
since the early 1970s. The UK differs in experiencing
more parallel dramatic drops in both violent and prop-
erty crime. Australian property crime fell dramatically by
30–40 percent from 2001, and violent crime trends were
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or increasing assaults (Mayhew 2012). New Zealand ex-
perienced falling property crime from the mid-1990s but
violent crime was more stable or with slight increases
(Mayhew 2012). When most crimes declines in a fashion
similar to the US, car theft in Canada remained high
through the 1990s then plummeted from the mid-2000s
(Farrell and Brantingham 2013). Hence there are some-
times considerable differences between countries and
within countries, and a hypothesis should not contradict
those facts.
Most hypotheses fail this test because they suggest all
types of crime should fall at the same time. For example,
the childhood lead hypothesis fails to explain within-
country variation both in terms of how violent and prop-
erty crime differ in some countries but not others (e.g.
they fall similarly in the UK but not NZ or the US), and
in terms of how some crimes fall at different times than
others (e.g. Canadian car theft compared to other
Canadian crimes). If the childhood lead hypothesis is
said to apply only to violent crime then it does not ex-
plain property crime falls. If it is said to explain both
violent and property crime then it cannot account for
why one but not the other falls in some instances. The
trajectory of car theft in Canada is a good example here,
because car theft fell far later than most crimes, falling
only from the mid-2000s onwards, which could not be
due to a decline in lead poisoning.
The security hypothesis does not contradict this test.
Specifically with respect to car theft, improved car se-
curity was introduced at different times in different
countries. This timing can also differ from the spread
of security for other crime types. Similarly, differences
in the trajectory of the car theft decline between places,
and between cities or regions within a country, are
probably explained at least in part by differences in af-
fluence and the rate of purchasing of new cars, and
hence the speed of penetration of new and better
security.
Discussion
The study findings are summarized in the matrix of
Table 3. A hypothesis either fails or passes each test,
with a fail shown as a cross (‘x’) and a pass as a check-
mark or tick (‘✔’).
One hypothesis fails all five tests, four fail four, seven
fail three, and two fail two tests (Table 3). The security
hypothesis appears to pass each test. It suggests that
more and better security drove the crime drop. Triangu-
lation from various data signatures provided strong
supporting evidence for car theft in Australia, and even
stronger for the UK (Farrell et al. 2011a, 2011b), simi-
larly strong evidence for the Netherlands (van ours and
Vollaard 2013), and supporting evidence for the US(Fujita and Maxfield 2012). Thus the security hypothesis
passes the preliminary evidence and cross-national tests.
The security hypothesis is crime specific. Car theft se-
curity improved and spread in the UK, for example, only
shortly before phones became widely available to steal
and the internet facilitated other crime types. Thus the
hypothesis is compatible with the increases in phone
theft and e-crimes, passing the third test. In the period
before car security became more sophisticated and
widespread, it was very easy to steal cars, and the num-
ber of car-related crime opportunities increased with
car ownership (Wilkins 1967). Thus the security hy-
pothesis is compatible with the existence of prior in-
creases in crime, passing the fourth test. Car security
was introduced and spread at different times in different
countries, reflecting both market differences and pur-
chasing rates for new cars, as well as differences in the
timing of national legislation and other activities
encouraging immobilizers. Thus the security hypothesis
is compatible with variation in the timing and trajectory
of the fall in car theft between countries, and variation
between crime types within a country, and so passes
the fifth test in relation to car crime. For example,
Canada’s decline in car theft occurred after it experi-
enced declines in many crime types, but this is consist-
ent with a later introduction of mandatory electronic
immobilizers.
Thus viewed, the security hypothesis passes all tests in
relation to car theft. Its main limitation is a lack of evi-
dence relating to other crime types, though it is con-
ceivable that different security measures impacted
various types of crime at different times. It is also con-
ceivable that, since many crimes are inter-linked, that a
version of the keystone crime hypothesis (Farrell et al.
2008, 2011a) occurred in some instances. Car theft plays
a key role in facilitating many other types of crime and
so its removal, like that of the keystone in an archway,
causes those around it to tumble. In addition, the secur-
ity hypothesis does not contradict other empirical evi-
dence relating to the nature of the declines in crime
such as the fact that falls in repeat victimization and
crime at hot spots play important roles (Weisburd et al.
2004, Thorpe 2007; Britton et al. 2012). The steeper de-
clines in more concentrated crime that these studies
found is consistent with crime falling more in places
(such as New York City) where it was previously at a
higher rate.
The security hypothesis proposes that more and better
security plays a key role in driving down different types
of crime, and that specifically:
“1. Security improvements, including specific security
devices, vary for different crimes but have been widely
implemented.
Table 3 Summary of findings
Hypothesis
Test
Preliminary Cross-
national
Prior crime E-crime & Variable
empirical increase phone theft trajectories
Strong economy x x x x x
Concealed weapons laws x x ✔ x x
Capital punishment x x ✔ x x
Gun control laws x x ✔ x x
Rising prison population ✔ x x x x
Policing strategies ✔ x ✔ x x
More police ✔ x ✔ x x
Legalization of abortion ✔ x ✔ x x
Immigration ✔ ✔ x x x
Consumer confidence ✔ ✔ x x x
Waning crack market ✔ x ✔ x x
Childhood lead ✔ ✔ ✔ x x
Changing demographics ✔ ✔ x x x
Civilizing process ✔ ✔ ✔ x x
Improved security ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Legend: ✔ = Pass. x = Fail.
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to reduce the crimes to which they are applied: they
increase actual or perceived risk to the offender; and/
or they reduce actual or perceived reward for the
offender; and/or they increase actual or perceived
effort for the offender.
3. The different ways in which security measures work
produce variations in expected changes in crime
patterns associated with crime drops. These comprise
expected security device crime change “signatures.”
4. The specific falls in crime produced by improvements
in security alongside their associated diffusions of
benefit (preventive effects spilling out beyond the
operational range of measures) to other targets and
methods of committing crime are not matched by
equivalent displacement.” (Farrell et al. 2011a; 152).
With respect to other crime types, there is mounting
evidence that burglary declines in different countries coin-
cide with the spread of more and better household secur-
ity (van Dijk 2008; Tilley et al. 2011). Clarke and Newman
outline some more widespread security improvements
that have occurred for various types of crime (Clarke and
Newman 2006). Businesses in particular have become
more aware of crime and the cost effectiveness of security,
and business improvement districts are suggested to have
brought down crime (MacDonald et al. 2010). Note that
the security hypothesis can be viewed as a component ofthe broader framework of crime opportunity theory (see
Clarke 2012). Changes in other crime opportunities may
pass the tests outlined here, and warrant further research.
For example, the declining value of some once-targeted
goods may play a role in the decline in some aspects of ac-
quisitive crime. Video cassette recorders then DVD-
players were drivers of burglary when they were valuable.
It is also conceivable that shifts in urban form and traffic
flows, including major changes such as growth in out-
of-city shopping malls in the 1990s, may have changed the
movement patterns of potential targets and offenders in
ways that reduced street crime. a Tseloni et al. (2012) set
out some steps towards a research agenda on crime
opportunity theory including the security hypothesis.
Conclusions
This study offers five tests as a step in the direction of
identifying a valid theory, or theories, of why many
countries have experienced significant crime declines.
An advantage of this approach is to allow some leeway
in relation to instances where the direct evaluation evi-
dence is disputed. Some of those disputes seem unlikely
to be resolved in the near future and so the present
study is useful in setting out additional assessment cri-
teria. Thus, for example, whether Joyce’s (2011) critique
of the abortion legalization hypotheses is sustained need
not be critical here because the hypothesis cannot ex-
plain non-US crime falls, and cannot be reconciled with
either increasing phone theft and e-crime or with vari-
able crime drop trajectories across crimes and places.
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The demographics hypothesis retains an intuitive appeal
for some commentators despite its impact being small at
most, so its failure in other tests further clarifies its limi-
tations. Demographic change suggests all types of crime
would decline similarly in accordance with population
change, with none increasing. Likewise, the childhood
lead hypothesis offers no insight into why some types of
crime increased when others were decreasing, why prop-
erty crime fell alongside violence in the UK but had been
falling for far longer than violence in the US, why there
is significant variation in the crime drop between crime
types in other countries, or why car theft in Canada fell
only a decade or more after other crimes. And while the
civilizing hypothesis is insightful when crime over the
centuries is considered, its explanatory mechanism for
dramatic recent crime drops seems weak and it lacks
supporting evidence but, more importantly for present
purposes, it also fails to explain why some crimes in-
creased and why there is variation between crime types
within countries.
Most hypotheses failed the phone theft and e-crime
test as well as the variable trajectories test. Those hy-
potheses seem insufficiently nuanced to account for dif-
ferences between crime types and places, particularly
when crime increased or failed to decrease. This reflects
their tendency to focus on the number or motivation of
offenders. In contrast, the security hypothesis focuses on
the number of suitable targets and capable guardians.
Thus viewed, the routine activity theory provides a use-
ful framework for comparing the hypotheses, even
though it is not changes in legal routine activities that
are considered as part of the security hypothesis.
The security hypothesis passes the five tests in relation
to car theft. Repeated support from studies of car theft
in Australia, England and Wales, the Netherlands, and
the United States, suggest it might now be considered a
theory rather than a hypothesis for that crime type. If so,
on present evidence it also tends to eliminate rival hy-
potheses. This would suggest that while the fields of en-
vironmental criminology and crime science have been
rather slow to address the crime drop, they offer a most
promising perspective.
Endnote
aI owe this last point to discussions with Pat and Paul
Brantingham.
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